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PROCEDURE-IMMUNITY OF NON-RESIDENT WITNESS
FROM SERVICE OF CIVIL PROCESS
The Acting Commonwealth's Attorney of Chesterfield
County, Virginia, subpoenaed Clyde E. Hackney, a resident of
Tennessee, to appear as a witness in a criminal proceeding.
The subpoena, which was mailed to him at his Tennessee address,
was neither issued nor served according to the manner pre-
scribed in the Uniform Act pertaining to out-of-state witnesses.1
Hackney accepted the subpoena, appeared and testified. While
he was in the act of returning to Tennessee immediately upon his
departure from court, he was served with summons in a civil
action and his automobile attached. The trial court found that
the defendant was privileged from service and his car could not be
attached. On appeal, held, affirmed. The Uniform Act2 was
passed in furtherance of the common law rule and did not sup-
plant it. Even though the statutory requirements had not been
met, under the circumstances a non-resident witness was immune
from service of process. Davis v. Hackney, 196 Va. 651, 85 S.E.
2d 245 (1955).
The doctrine granting non-resident witnesses immunity from
service of civil process and arrest while going to, attending, and
returning from, court is an English common law rule.3 Lord
Mansfield summarized the doctrine as to privilege from arrest:
... in order to encourage witnesses to come forward volun-
tarily they are privileged from arrest. The privilege pro-
tects them in coming, in staying, and in returning provided
they act bonA fide, and without delay, which is a question of
reasonableness.4
In the same opinion he extended this immunity, which had pre-
viously been applicable only to residents, to include non-resi-
'Va. Code §19-242 through §19-252 (1950, Supp. 1954), Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from without a State in Criminal Proceedings.
'Ibid.
'Lightfoot v. Cameron, 2 Black.W. 1113, 96 Eng.Rep. 658 (K.B. 1776); Walpole
v. Alexander, 3 Doug. 45 46, 99 Eng.Rep. 530, 531 (K.B. 1782); Poole v. GoulI, 1
H.&N. 99 99, 156 E .ep. 1133, 1134 (1896).
Walpole v. Alexander, 3 Doug. 45, 46, 99 Eng.Rep. 530, 531 (K.B. 1782). Note that
in the instant statement by Lord Mansfield the term 'arrest " is used, but the rule
was not restricted to immunity from arrest; it was extended also to immunity from
service of civil process. Cf. Poole v. Gould, 1 H.& N. 99, 99, 156 Eng.Rep. 1133,
1134 (1856).
dents.5 Thereafter the courts generally applied the same princi-
ples to all persons in attendance upon a court, whether com-
pelled by process or not.8
The great weight of authority7 in the United States concurs
in protecting non-resident suitors, both plaintiff and defend-
ant, and witnesses from civil process, as well as from civil arrest,
while in attendance upon court,8 although two states, Rhode Is-
land and Illinois, appear to have rejected this rule in part.9
In Baldwin v. Emerson,10 a case decided by the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court, it was stated:
The general rule relating lo protection from the service of
process is that all persons who have any relation to a cause
which calls for their attendance in court are protected from
arrest while going to and attending court and returning.
This protection, however, is not wholly, nor chiefly, the
privilege of the person, but is granted in the interest of the
public, that the courts may not be embarrassed or impeded
in the conduct of their business. Hence, it has generally
been held that the protection is limited to exemption from
arrest and does not extend to the service of process, which
does not interfere with or prevent the attendance of the per-
son upon court.11 (Emphasis added)
The Court, however, continues with a brief survey of the cases
from other jurisdictions and concludes:
While we concede the force of the reasons advanced for
protecting non-resident witnesses from service of a sum-
mons against them for the commencement of a suit, eundo,
morando, et redeundo, we are not convinced of the suffi-
ciency of the reasons assigned for the exemption of non-
resident suitors from such process.12 (Emphasis added)
6 Walpole v. Alexander, 3 Doug. 45, 46, 99 Eng.Rep. 530, 531 (K.B. 1782).
Meekins v. Smith, 1 Black.H. 636, 637, 126 Eng.Rep. 363, 363 (C.P. 1791; Er parte
Jackson, 15 Ves.Jr. 117, 33 Eug.Rep. 699 (Ch. 1808). See 3 BI.Comm. *289, 290.
742 Am.Jur., Process §142 (1942).
S Paul v. Stuckey, 176 Ark. 389, 189 S.W. 676 (1918); Chittenden v, Charter, 82
Conn. 585 74 A- 884 (1909); Wilson v. Donaldson, 117 Ind 356 20 NE. 250(1889); Northwestern Casualty and Security Co. v. Conoway, 225 Iowa 112, 230
N.W. 548 (1930); Bolgiano v. Gilbert Lock Co., 73 Md. 132, 20 A. 788 (1890);
Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926); Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222(1932).
o Keefe and Roscia Immunity and Sentimantality, 32 Cornell LQ. 471, 481, 488 (1947).10 16 R.I. 304, 15 A. 83 (1888).
11 16 R.I. 304, .. , 15 A. 83, 83.
12 16 R.I. 304 ...... 15 A. 83, 84.
Thus the court expressly limits its restriction of the application
of this doctrine to suitors but at least by dictum grants such im-
munity both from arrest and service of process to non-resident
witnesses while in attendance upon court. 13
Likewise, in Greer v. Young, an Illinois case, the court did
not limit its statement of the law in question to the immunity of
suitors in a proceeding. It asserted, 'The parties to a suit and
their witnesses are, for the sake of public justice, protected from
arrest . . ."14 (Emphasis added) The same court in another
case,15 following the rule laid down in the Greer case, stated:
Notwithstanding the authorities in some other states sup-
port the doctrine that a party, under the facts set forth in
this case (the non-resident, a defendant in a previous case,
was in the jurisdiction in connection with the taking of dep-
ositions when he was personally served with civil process)
is exempt from service of civil process, the rule is different
in this State."'6 (Emphasis added)
Apparently, Rhode Island restricts its application of the
generally accepted doctrine granting immunity to both suitors
and witnesses, but it has, by dictum, allowed non-resident wit-
nesses full use of the immunity and is thereby brought, to that
extent, into accord with-the majority rule. Illinois, then, is the
only jurisdiction which unequivocally rejects all arguments for
granting non-resident witnesses freedom from service of civil
process.
The early Virginia cases, unlike the Illinois treatment of this
doctrine, followed closely the English rule, excusing officers of
the court, as well as witnesses and suitors from civil process and
arrest. Chancellor Wythe expounded the law in question, "No
law is necessary to be made. This privilege is part of the Com-
mon Law of England, which we have adopted . ."17 In 1823
this rule was extended by the Virginia courts to allow such rea-
sonable time as necessary, eundo, morando, et redeundo.18 As
13 Ellis v. De Garmo 17 R. 715 24 A. 579 (1892). decided by the same court, followed
the ruie as set forth in Baldwin v. Emerson, suPra notes 11 & 12.
"120 Ill. 184 . 11 N.E. 167, 169 (1887).
1 Cassem v. Galvin, 158 Il1. 30, 41 N.E. 1087 (1895).
' 158 I. 30. 41 N.E. 1087, 1088.SCommonwealth v. Ronald 4 Call (8 Va.) 97, 98 (1786).
18 Richards v. Goodson, 2 Va.Cas. 381, 382 (1828).
late as 1931 the law as set forth by Chancellor Wythe was fol-
lowed.19
The reasons given for protecting a non-resident witness are
almost universally the same. It is a matter of public policy to
give such a privilege for protection of the court in the adminis-
tration of justice.2° This rule is necessary for the maintenance
of the court's authority and dignity-the benefit to the individual
is merely incidental.21 In Stewart v. Ramsey22 in a well-con-
sidered opinion, Mr. Justice Pitney adhered to the above reason-
ing and continued:
Witnesses would be chary of coming within our jurisdiction,
and would be exposed to dangerous influences, if they might
be punished with a law suit for displeasing parties by their
testimony...23
The reasons in support of this doctrine speak for themselves.
Such a principle, so embedded in American jurisprudence, is not
likely to be modified by the courts. However, as in the Hackney
case, the immunity in question is often the subject of controversy
in cases involving the interpretation of, statutes dealing therewith.
In a case 2' arising under a North Carolina Statute,2 5 it was
stated that the immunity from service of process in civil actions
is "... a settled rule based upon high consideration of public
policy not upon statutory law... The exemption, being long and
universally recognized, and not being statutory, could only be re-
pealed by an express statute, which no state has passed."26
In Mallory v. Brewer27 which, although not directly in
point with the Hackney case because of the statute under con-
19 Wheeler v. Flintoff, 156 Va. 923, 159 S.E. 112 (1931).
ROMurrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 F.2d 741 (1932), cert. denied 289 U.S. 740(1933); Kelly v. Pennington, 78 Colo. 482, 242 P. 681 (1926); towperwait v.
Lamb, 373 Pa. 204, 95 A.2d 510 (1953); Wheeler v. Flintoff, 156 Va. 923, 159
S.E. 112 (1931).
21 Cotten v. Frazier, 170 Tenn. 301,. , 95 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1936); Wheeler v. Flintoff,
156 Va. 923, 159 S.E. 112 (1931).
n2242 U.S. 128 (1916). See the citations in this case in reference to the immunity of
witnessaes from service of process while attending court voluntarily as well as
under subpoena.
Id. at 130.
:- Cooper v. Wyman, 122 N.C. 784, 29 S.E. 947 (1898).
... (Code, §§1367, 1735) . . . statutes prohibiting the arrest in civil actions of
parties attending court as witnesses . . ... 122 N.C. 784, 29 S.E. 947, 948.
ss 122 N.C. 784 ........ 29 S.E. 947, 947, 948.
2 7 S.D. 587, 64 N.W. 1120 (1895).
sideration,28 stresses the strength of the common law rule and
the reluctance with which the courts tend to modify it, it was
said that immunity of witnesses from foreign jurisdictions "is not
based upon statute but upon public policy."2 9 The tenacity
with which the courts hold to a rule of the common law is again
evidenced by a per curiam opinion from. the Court of Appeals
of Ohio.30 A statute similar in text to that of Virginia3' was
under consideration. 32  The court stated, "There is a rule of
interpretation that a statute will not be presumed to derrogate
from or abrogate the Common Law.... [While the statute allows
a method of exemption, it] evinces no intention to make such
condition to exemption exclusive ... [and] the underlying rea-
son.., applies in full force to a witness whether in the jurisdic-
tion under subpoena or otherwise."33
If the individual is to be allowed personal immunity from
arrest and service of process in order to better achieve the ends
of justice, it would appear that such immunity should also extend
to his property which would not be in the jurisdiction but for
his attendance upon court as a witness. On this point Mr. Chief
Justice Clark of the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
If the defendant was exempt, as is unquestioned, from
the service of summons, then his books which were brought
to be used as evidence in the case and his necessary personal
effects, such as clothing and the like, were exempt from
attachment, because it was necessary for him to have them
in attending trial. If this were not so, then the privilege
would be nugatory. It could not be expected that the de-
fendant would come from his home . . . without the neces-
sary underclothing and toilet articles for his use. If not en-
titled to this, then, in the language used by a member of
Congress, as set out in the Congressional Record, which
therefore must be of sufficient dignity to be used here, a
witness or a suitor from another state would be forced to
23 "Section 5274, Comp.Laws S.D. . . . 'A witness shall not be liable to be sued in a
county. in which he does not reside, by being served with a summons while going,
returning, or attending in obedience to a subpoena.'" 7 S.D. 587 . 64 N... W.1120, 1122.
55 7 S.D. 587 . 64 N.W. 1120. 1122.
50 Rhoads v. Dennis, 115 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio App. 1951).
51 See note 2 supra.
2' "A witness shall not be liable to be sued, in a county in which he does not reside bybeing served with a summons in such county while going, returning, or attendingin obedience to a subpoena." Section 11519 General Code of Ohio (presently Section
2317.29 R.C. of Ohio).
22 Rhoads v. Dennis, 115 N.E.2d 708, 710 (Ohio App. 1951).
come in light marching order, for, as said in the above
speech, he would be-
"Like the poor benighted Hindoo
Who does the best he kin do,
And for clothes he makes his skin do."34
Based upon the reasoning of Chief Justice Clark it would
seem that all the arguments advanced by the courts for personal
exemption from service of process should be properly extended
to include such "necessaries" as would facilitate the attendance
of a witness. Today, although the witness could make a train
do, it would seem that an automobile as a convenient mode of
transportation should be included in what Clark terms "neces-
saries."
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia could have reached no other conclusion than it did in the
case under comment. The common law rule granting immunity
to non-resident witnesses from service of civil process is founded
both upon the principles of natural justice and upon the authori-
ty, dignity, and impartiality associated with all courts of justice.
The courts in protecting such principles expressly voice their
abhorrence of personal suits which would, if not limited to
the proper forum and time, overthrow the very bases upon which
justice and equality at the bar are established.
Had there been no need of Hackney's presence in Virginia,
Davis would have been free to journey to Tennessee and there
institute a suit in the proper court of that state. He is still en-
titled to do so. Permit him to take advantage of the privileges
and immunities granted to the citizens of the several states by
the Federal Constitution, but do not allow him to obstruct the
judicial process of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
It is also submitted that the General Assembly of Virginia
could have prevented the question in issue from ever arising by
a more precise enactment which would not have infringed upon
the essential uniform nature of the Act, thereby lessening the
81 Winder v. Penniman, 181 N.C. 7 ........ 105 S.E. 884, 886 (1921).
burden on the courts. Since the General Assembly did not do
so, the authoritative sounding board for ambiguous legislation
in Virginia has resolved the question most equitably according
to its very best traditions.
George Ervin Dal
